OCSP blog posts, some minor spell fixes.
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@ -5,14 +5,13 @@ date: 2019-08-06
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comments: true
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tags: ocsp, tor, security, privacy
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---
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# Trouble with OCSP
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> This is a post about side channel information leakage that was present in OnionBrowser in some OCSP flows. This is not a exhaustive documentation of OCSP protocol.
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> This is a post about side channel information leakage that was present in OnionBrowser in some OCSP flows. This post omits a lot of details about OCSP protocol.
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Digital certificates are issued for a longer timespan. It reduces maintaince overhead. Most of the cases CAs issue a certificate and they are valid untill the expiration time.
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Digital certificates are issued for a longer timespan. It reduces maintenance overhead. Most of the cases CAs issue a certificate and they are valid until the expiration time.
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But what are we to do when a certificate is compromised? We can
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re-issue a certificate, but the old one is still in the wind. Thats
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re-issue a certificate, but the old one is still in the wind. That's
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where Online Certificate Status Protocol comes in. It defines a way to
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check validity of a certificate in a timely[^1] manner.
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@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ the certificate itself, removing the need for another seperate
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request.
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## Dissecting an OCSP Request
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If the request is <255 bytes, OCSP allows it to be passed as a GET path. So a typical request looks like this
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If the request is <255 bytes, OCSP allows it to be passed as a GET path. A typical request looks like this
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```bash
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GET http://ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org/MFgwVqADAgEAME8wTTBLMAkGBSsOAwIaBQAEFH7maudymrP8%2BKIgZGwWoS1gcQhdBBSoSmpjBH3duubRObemRWXv86jsoQISA6D%2BPqgUVCy3wtolHIxq%2Bk0e
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@ -77,7 +76,7 @@ curl https://crt.sh/?serial=03a0fe3ea814542cb7c2da251c8c6afa4d1e
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## Privacy Takes a Backseat.
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Careful examination of above workflow will reveal that the OCSP flow
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is happening over HTTP. Most issuers seems to stick to http; possibly
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is happening over HTTP. Most issuers seem to stick to http; possibly
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to avoid cyclical dependencies. This means man-in-the-middle leakage
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of certificates a user is validating is happening, and by extension
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leakage of websites user is accessing.
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@ -97,11 +96,11 @@ Whenever Onion Browser accesses a website with EV cert, (for e.g
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I stumbled upon this accidently while inspecting requests from my
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iPhone with [mitmproxy](https://mitmproxy.org/). The bug was reported
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to Onion Browser team and [they have a better write up of the
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situation](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser/wiki/2019-178:-sites-with-EV-HTTPS-certificates-leak-information-via-OCSP). Unfortunatly
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it is really hard to fix. :-(
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to Onion Browser team and [they have a nice write up of the
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situation](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser/wiki/2019-178:-sites-with-EV-HTTPS-certificates-leak-information-via-OCSP). Unfortunately,
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it is hard to fix. :-(
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[^1]: Opposed to checking againist a [Certificate Revocation List](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_revocation_list).
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[^2]: Familier readers will note that this is plain OCSP, the non-stapling kind.
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[^1]: Opposed to checking against a [Certificate Revocation List](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_revocation_list).
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[^2]: Familiar readers will note that this is plain OCSP, the non-stapling kind.
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@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ body {
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text-align: left;
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}
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blockquote {
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font-style: italic;
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}
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video, code {
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font-weight: 500;
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max-width: 100%;
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